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A Study in "Actuarial Justice":
Sex Offender Classification Practice and
Procedure
Wayne A. Logan*
"[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified,
and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical
or careless."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although recidivism among select criminal subgroups
has long been a central focus of American penology,2 the
current generation of sex offender registration and
community notification laws surely marks a high water
mark in this regard.3  Driven by affirmative "legislative
findings"4 that typically vastly overstate the capacity of
* Assistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New
York, Albany. B.A., Wesleyan University; M.A., State University of New York,
Albany; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American Society
335-39 (1993); Nicole Rafiner, Eugenics, Class, and the Professionalization of
Social Control, in Inequality, Crime and Social Control (G. Bridges & M. Myers
eds., 1994); Note, Criminal Registration Laws, 27 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 295
(1936); Note, Criminal Statistics and Identification of Criminals, 19 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 36 (1928).
3. Criminal registration laws trace their origins in the United States back to
at least the 1930s. See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control
Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 60, 62 (1954). California is believed
to have enacted the first exclusively sex offender-oriented registration law in
1947. See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws 45, in National Conference on Sex Offender
Registries (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998). The State of Washington, in
1990, became the first U.S. jurisdiction to implement a "notification" provision for
sex offenders. Id. For an insightful examination of why sex offenders, in
particular, historically have been singled out for special treatment, see Deborah
W. Denno, Life Before the Modem Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1317
(1998).
4. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-902 (Michie 1999) ("The General
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social science to predict the likelihood, frequency, and
nature of sex offender recidivism, 5 such laws are now
Assembly finds that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release
from custody ... . "); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.21(3)(a) (West 1999) ("Sexual offenders
are extremely likely to use physical violence and repeat their offenses .... ");
Idaho Code § 18-8302 (1999) ('The legislature finds that sexual offenders present
a significant risk of reoffense .... "); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:540(A) (West 1999)
("The Legislature finds that sex offenders, sexually violent predators, and child
predators often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses... even after being
released .... "); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 74 § 1 (1999) ("The general court hereby
finds that: (1) the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders ... to be grave and
that the protection of the public from these sex offenders is of paramount interest
to the government .... "); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-4002 (Michie 1999) ("The
Legislature finds that sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat
offenses."); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-11A-2(A) (Michie 1999) ("The legislature finds
that: (1) sex offenders pose a significant risk of recidivism .... "); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-208.5 (1999) ("The General Assembly recognizes that sex offenders often pose
a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from
incarceration or confinement.... "); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.02(2) (Anderson
1999) ("Sexual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging
in further offenses even after being released .... "); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 581(B)
(1999) ('The Legislature finds that sex offenders who commit other predatory acts
against children... pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-400 (Law. Co-op. 1999) ("Statistics show that sex offenders
pose a high risk of re-offending."); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-101(b)(1) (1997)
("sexual offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses after release ...
and protection from these offenders is a paramount public interest.").
The Colorado Legislature, in contrast, has adopted the nation's most
measured provision of this sort:
The general assembly hereby finds that a small percentage of persons who
are convicted of offenses involving unlawful sexual behavior and who are
identified as sexually violent predators may pose a high enough level of
risk to the community that persons in the community should receive
notification concerning the identify of these sexually violent predators. The
general assembly also recognizes the high potential for vigilantism that
often results from community notification and the dangerous potential that
the fear of such vigilantism will drive a sex offender to disappear and
attempt to live without supervision. The general assembly therefore finds
that sex offender notification should only occur in cases involving a high
degree of risk to the community and should only occur under carefully
controlled circumstances that include providing additional information and
education to the community concerning supervision and treatment of sex
offenders.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-901 (1999).
5. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 715 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Mass. 1999) (concluding that
"the expert evidence makes plain that the data concerning recidivism rates
change significantly depending on circumstances .... We glean from that
evidence that uncertainties surround many aspects of the subject of sex offender
recidivism."). Indeed, sex offender risk assessments are notoriously inaccurate in
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subjecting hundreds of thousands of offenders to ongoing
state control and community opprobrium, sometimes for
their lifetimes.6  With their avowed faith in the predictive
capacity of aggregate statistics, present-day registration
and notification laws appear the embodiment of what
Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon call "actuarial
justice," an approach characterized by a pervasive
skepticism, indeed pessimism, about the capacity of certain
offenders to pursue lawful lives.7 To a significant extent,
the laws serve "a kind of waste management function,"8 a
favor of finding false-positives. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, The Use of Social Science
and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ.
Confinement 347, 372 (1997) (citing studies); Jenny A. Montana, Note, An
Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's
Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & Pol'y 569, 590 (1995) (noting that predictions of
dangerousness result in false-positives two-thirds of the time). See generally R.
Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Mete-Analysis of
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. of Consult. & Clinical Psych. 348, 357
(1998) (concluding, on basis of review of multiple empirical studies, that only 13%
of offenders committed new sex offenses within 4-5 year follow-up period); Robert
J. McGrath, Sex-Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition Planning: A Review
of Empirical and Clinical Findings, 35 Intl J. of Offender Therapy & Comp.
Criminology 328, 331 (1995) (providing comprehensive review of studies revealing
the difficulty of assessing likelihood of sex offender recidivism). Even more
fundamentally, there exists widespread disagreement over whether, in fact, sex
offenders as a criminal sub-group manifest higher recidivism rates than other
criminal actors. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence
in Sex Offense Cases, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 529, 572-73 (1994) (stating that "no study
has demonstrated that sex offenders have a consistently higher or lower
recidivism rate than other major offenders."); Kirk Heilbrun et al., Sexual
Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention and Decision Making, 4 Psychol.
Pub. Pol'y & L. 138, 139 (1998) (noting that there is "little consensus in the
literature").
6. See Megan's Law in All 50 States, <http:/www.klaaskids.org/pg-
legmeg.htm> (providing state-by-state totals of registered offenders).
7. See, e.g., Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The
emerging New Criminal Law, in The Futures of Criminology 173, 174 (David
Nekin ed., 1994).
8. Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449, 470
(1992). See also Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 Psychol. Pub. Poly & L. 505, 560 (1998) (observing that
"[a] paradigm shift has occurred in which the focus has moved from
dangerousness to risk."). For an insightful discussion of the ongoing legal,
scientific, and ethical controversies surrounding actuarial versus clinical risk
assessments more generally see Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness:
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massive corrections experiment taking place beyond prison
walls.9
In a departure from previous commentaries, which
focused largely on the constitutionality of registration and
notification,10 issues now largely resolved by the courts,"
this Article addresses the methods now being used by U.S.
jurisdictions to sort and classify sex offenders deemed by
legislatures to possibly warrant registration and
community notification. 12 As will be evident, jurisdictions
Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 61 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Tim Doulin, Sex-Abuse Hearings Piling Up, The Columbus
Dispatch (Ohio), Apr. 29, 1999, at 1A (discussing how prosecutors, public
defenders and courts are struggling to carry out classification hearings for
hundreds of current and previously convicted offenders).
10. See, e.g., Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter Laws" of the 1990s: A
Response to the Critics, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1081 (1997); Stephen R. McAllister, The
Constitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 Washburn L.J. 419
(1997); April R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 885 (1995).
11. For examples of unsuccessful eighth amendment claims see, Roe v.
Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998); Doe v. Kelly, 961 F. Supp. 1105,
1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 674 (Kan. 1998); Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 405 (N.J. 1995). For examples of unsuccessful ex post facto
and double jeopardy claims see, Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404; Spencer v.
O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d
1127, 1132 (Wyo. 1996). For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in several cases raising unsuccessful constitutional challenges to
registration and notification. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stearns v. Gregiore, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Doe v.
Patali, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B. v.
Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Vemiero v. W.P.,
118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998). Moreover, the Court's outright approval of Kansas'
"Sexually Violent Predator Act," in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997),
which involved the post-confinement, involuntary civil commitment of sex
offenders, further signals the Court's disinclination to find basic constitutional
fault with registration and notification, a demonstrably less intrusive method of
social control. See generally Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas
v. Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1279 (1998) (discussing historic and modern applications of sex
offender commitment laws).
12. At present, jurisdictions use any (or some combination) of three primary
methods of informing communities of the whereabouts of registered offenders.
These involve: (1) "public access," which requires interested members of the
community to request information from a given jurisdiction's registry (which can
exist in written or CD-ROM form, and at times can also be accessed by telephone
"hot-line"); (2) Internet access, whereby the jurisdiction maintains a sex offender
"web site" containing registrants' information; and (3) affirmative community
2000] ACTUARIAL JUSTICE 597
differ broadly not just in their basic approaches to
classification for purposes of notification, but also in the
procedural and substantive rules that increasingly
dominate sex offender classification decision-making. In
many jurisdictions these procedures were imposed
legislatively from the outset, with little in the way of
judicial refinements occurring over time. In others,
successful due process challenges have resulted in
imposition of new procedural requirements, where none (or
some lesser form) initially existed legislatively. 3
Taken as a whole, the various approaches now in use
reflect differing levels of faith in the actuarial capacity of
the justice system to predict sex offender recidivism. In
many jurisdictions, for instance, legislatures have
mandated that offenders convicted of specified offenses
register and be subject to notification, without regard for
individual risk, in explicit deference to empirical estimates
notification by law enforcement, which can involve the use of informational fliers
and door-to-door visits by police. See Devon B. Adams, U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Update 1999: Summary of State Sex Offender Registry Dissemination
Procedures (Aug. 1999) (describing variety of methods); Alan R. Kabat, Scarlet
Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community Notification: Sacrificing Personal
Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 333, 344-45 (1998) (same).
Among the various strategies, the Internet, with its unrestricted geographic
sweep and capacity to convey large amounts of information, arguably possesses
the greatest potential for widespread dissemination--even beyond state or local
boundaries. Indeed, in California, where authorities primarily use a CD-ROM to
effectuate notification, individuals have transcribed registrant information and
implemented their own web sites. See Kathleen Ingley, Sex Offender Info Goes
Online; Posting Seen as Powerful Tool, Menace, Ariz. Republic, May 4, 1999, at
Al. Maintaining and ensuring the accuracy of such information among the states
that utilize the Internet method has become a costly and time-consuming
endeavor. Id.
13. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174 (D. Mass. 1998);
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997); In re Risk Level
Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995); Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964
P.2d 990 (Or. 1998). But see Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting procedural due process challenge); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079
(9th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Stearns v. Gregoire, 118 S. Ct. 1191
(1998); Femedeer v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 35 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D. Utah 1999)
(same); Doe v. Kelly, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (same); Lanni v.
Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same).
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of unacceptably high rates of sex offender recidivism. In
others, less actuarial faith is evinced, and offenders are
evaluated on a case-by case basis often by means of "risk
assessment" tools, themselves premised on recidivism risk-
related criteria. Even among this latter category of
jurisdictions, however, basic differences prevail on the core
issues of how much proof is required to satisfy risk-level
classification criteria, which party (offender or the state)
bears the burden of proof, and whether a right to appeal
the classification exists, issues that similarly turn on risk
and its allocation.
In short, with sex offender registration and community
notification in effect virtually nationwide, Americans are
now engaged in an unprecedented national experiment in
actuarial justice. This Article represents an initial inquiry
into the procedural machinery involved in this
undertaking, and considers what the diversity of
procedures adopted by jurisdictions perhaps says about our
faith in actuarial justice.
II. FEDERAL LAW
Current federal law pertaining to sex offender
registration and community notification has its origins in
three recent congressional initiatives. The initial federal
law, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, enacted in
September 1994, specifies the minimum standards for state
registration of sex offenders. The Wetterling Act directs
states to obtain particular information from designated sex
offenders, requires eligible sex offenders to remain
registered for at least ten years, and mandates that states
release "relevant information that is necessary to protect
the public concerning a specific person required to
register." 4 States must register persons convicted of a
criminal offense against a victim who is a minor 5 and those
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071(a)(1)(A), (b)(6)(A)(e)(2) (Supp. 1999).
15. Such an offense is defined as:
any criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is
598
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convicted of a "sexually violent offense."' Registration
information, at a minimum, for such offenders must
include name, address, fingerprints and a photograph.
17
Offenders are to remain subject to the law for the entire
minimum ten-year period, with exceptions made only when
the underlying conviction is reversed, vacated or set aside,
or the offender is pardoned.'"
The federal standards "constitute a floor for state
programs, not a ceiling"; states are free to broaden the list
of eligible offense categories, lengthen the mandated
registration period, and impose other measures more
stringent than required by the Wetterling Act.19 Likewise,
although Wetterling requires that registered information
be released, as "necessary to protect the public,"2" federal
requirements on the geographic scope, method and extent
comparable to or which exceeds the following range of offenses:
(i) kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent;
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent;
(iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a minor;
(iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct;
(v) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
(vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution;
(vii) any conduct that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor; or
(viii) an attempt to commit an offense described in any of clauses (i)
through (vii), if the State-
(I) makes such an attempt a criminal offense; and
(11) chooses to include such an offense in those which are criminal offenses
against a victim who is a minor for the purposes of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
16. Defined by federal law to include "a range of offenses specified by State
law which is comparable to or which exceeds the range of offenses encompassed
by aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse... or an offense that has as its
elements engaging in physical contact with another person with intent to commit
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse." 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B) (Supp.
1999).
17. See Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64
Fed. Reg. 572, 579 (issued Jan. 5, 1999, amended Jan. 22, 1999) [hereinafter
Final Guidelines].
18. See id. at 576.
19. Id. at 575.
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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of registration information disseminated are notably open-
ended.2 Also, and most important to the discussion here,
Congress provided states with considerable discretion
relative to standards and procedures for determining which
offenders warrant specific degrees of notification. 22
According to the Final Guidelines implementing the
Wetterling Act, the states retain discretion to make
judgments concerning the circumstances in which, and the
extent to which, the disclosure of registration information
to the public is necessary for public safety purposes and to
specify standards and procedures for making those
classification determinations.'
The Parn Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and
Identification Act of 1996 amended the Wetterling Act,
increasing the registration requirements in relation to
certain serious offenders. Pursuant to the Lychner Act,
states must impose lifetime registration for offenders with
one or more prior convictions for a registration-eligible
offense and those initially convicted of specified
aggravated" sex offenses.24 The latter category covers sex
crimes involving penetration through the use or threat of
force, and sexual acts involving penetration with victims
below the age of twelve.
21. See Final Guidelines, supra note 17, at 581-82.
22. See id. at 582.
23. Id. The Guidelines acknowledge the acceptability of at least three
different classification approaches. First, states can engage in "particularized
risk assessments of registered offenders, with differing degrees of information
released based on the degree of risk." Second, states are free to "make judgments
concerning the degree of danger posed by different types of offenders and to
provide information disclosure for all offenders (or only offenders) with certain
characteristics or in certain offense categories." Third, states can provide
information on registrants upon request and "make judgments about which
registered offenders or classes of registered offenders should be covered and what
information will be disclosed concerning these offenders." Id. As discussed at
length infra, these approaches are reflected to varying degrees in the evolving
classification systems of the states.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(i)-(ii).
25. See Final Guidelines, supra note 17, at 582. The Final Guidelines reflect
the additional requirement contained in the Lychner Act that information, to
some degree, must be circulated to the public, not just local law enforcement,
governmental and non-governmental agencies, prospective employers and victims
600
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Finally, pursuant to the Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, Congress prescribed heightened registration and
notification requirements for offenders deemed "sexually
violent predators" (SVPs), 26 which federal law mandates
that jurisdictions take steps to identify.27 Such an offender
is one who has "been convicted of a sexually violent offense
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
predatory sexually violent offenses."28 Jurisdictions are
free to decide the timing of the determination of whether
an offender is a SVP (at pre-release or time of sentencing)
and how the determination is to be initiated (either by
prosecutorial discretion or routinely after conviction for a
sexually violent offense).29
Federal law is more particular with respect to the
procedures used to identify SVPs. The determination must
be "made by a court after considering the recommendation
of a board composed of experts in the behavior and
treatment of sex offenders, victims' rights advocates, and
representatives of law enforcement agencies." 0  The
Department of Justice, however, can (1) waive these
requirements if a state "has established alternative
procedures or legal standards for designating a person as a
of registrants' offenses: "Information must be released to members of the public
as necessary to protect the public from registered offenders." Final Guidelines,
supra note 17, at 581.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2), (a)(3)(C)-(E), (b)(1)(B), (b)(3)(B), (b)(6)(B)(iii)
(Supp. 1999).
27. See Final Guidelines, supra note 17, at 583.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(C). For a definition of "sexually violent offense"
see supra note 16. Federal law defines "mental abnormality" as follows:
a congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emotional or
volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person
to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person
a menace to the health and safety of other persons.
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(D). Congress failed to define "personality disorder,"
thereby making the category "a matter of state discretion." See Final Guidelines,
supra note 17, at 583.
29. See id. at 583.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(A).
6012000]
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sexually violent predator";3 1 or (2) "approve alternative
measures of comparable or greater effectiveness in
protecting the public from unusually dangerous or
recidivistic sexual offenders."32 As for the latter, the Final
Guidelines suggest as acceptable alternatives the use of
live expert and other testimony to permit courts to reach
their own decisions or, in lieu of judicial involvement,
delegate responsibility to "a parole board or other
administrative agency with adjudicatory functions."3
SVPs, at a minimum, must provide the following
information: their name, "identifying factors, anticipated
future residence, offense history, and documentation of any
treatment received for the[ir] mental abnormality or
personality disorder."4 Federal law also requires that SVPs
verify their address information on a more frequent basis,
quarterly, 5  and remain subject to registration and
notification requirements throughout their lifetimes.36
Congress has required that all U.S. jurisdictions
comply with the aforementioned standards by November
25, 2000, subject to possible extension, under threat of loss
of a significant portion of federal law enforcement
funding.37 At present, virtually all U.S. jurisdictions have
some form of registration and notification classification
regime in place, although not all satisfy the specific federal
requirements set forth above.
III. TBE MECHANICS OF CLASSIFICATION
Jurisdictions now use two basic methods of classifying
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(B).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(C).
33. Final Guidelines, supra note 17, at 583.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(B).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(3)(B).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B) (iii).
37. See Final Guidelines, supra note 17, at 586. According to the Final
Guidelines, states that fail to come into compliance within the specific time
periods will be subject to a mandatory 10% reduction of Byrne Formula Grant
funding, and any funds that are not allocated to non-complying states will be
reallocated to states that are in compliance. Id.
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sex offenders for purposes of notification: compulsory and
discretionary.38  The compulsory method, used in nineteen
states, 9 requires all offenders convicted of certain child or
sex offenses specified by the legislature to register and
undergo notification, without regard for risk of individual
offender recidivism. °  In Tennessee, for instance,
38. To the extent possible, the procedures discussed here are current as of
October, 1999 based on a state-by-state Westlaw review of existing statutory law
and telephone conversations with local authorities. The survey made it quite
evident that sex offender classification procedures are in a significant state of
flux, due both to state efforts to comply with the federal mandates, and the highly
charged political nature of the subject matter. Another factor complicating the
analysis here is that jurisdictions very often prescribe different procedures for
different offender populations, drawing distinctions on the basis of date of offense
or release. For practical purposes, the Article therefore focuses only upon law and
procedures affecting offenders subject to the classification approach most recently
put in effect.
Also, the approaches of two jurisdictions, Vermont and Pennsylvania, will
not be addressed here. Vermont, at this time, has no system in place to effectuate
registrant community notification, yet it is expected that the Vermont Legislature
will revamp the State's system by May, 2000. Telephone Interview with Max
Schlueter, Director, Vermont Criminal Information Center, Dept. of Public Safety
(January 11, 2000) (transcript on file with author). In Pennsylvania, a successful
due process challenge to the Commonwealth's classification and notification
system has obliged the legislature to recast the system used there. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W.
3311 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000). It is expected that the legislature will do so some time
in Spring 2000. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Hitz, Office of Legislative
Affairs, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (January 11, 2000)
(transcript on file with author).
For a discussion of the emerging procedural due process concerns in the
area, especially whether community notification jeopardizes constitutionally
protectible liberty interests, see Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (forthcoming 2000).
39. See Ala. Code § 15-20-21 (1999); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.65.087, 12.63.010 et
seq. (Michie 1999); Cal. Penal Code § 290 et seq. (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §
54-251 et seq. (1999); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(3) (1999); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat.
150/3 et seq. (West 1999); Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4 et seq. (1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
29-4902 et seq. (1999); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.722 et seq. (West 1999); Miss.
Code Ann. § 45-33-1 et seq. (1999); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.400 et seq. (1999); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-B:1 et seq. (1999); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-11A-2 et seq.
(Michie 1999); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 581 et seq. (1999); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-410
et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-31 et seq. (Michie 1999);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-102 et seq. (1997); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 et seq.
(1999); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-298.1 (Michie 1999).
40. A few states in this category do provide courts a degree of modest
discretion to not subject offenders to registration and notification. Alabama, for
604 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:593
individuals convicted of specified sex offenses are required
to register, without regard to individual risk.41  The
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation thereafter makes
available on its Internet site the registration information
collected (including the offender's name, home address,
photo, date of birth, and driver's license number)." In
Oklahoma, depending on which statutorily specified crime
an offender is convicted of, the offender is classified as a
"sex offender," or a "habitual" or "aggravated sex
offender."43  Sex offenders must verify their registration
status annually for ten years, 4  while habitual or
aggravated offenders must do so every ninety days for their
lifetimes.45  Information (e.g., name, address, photo, and
offense) on all registrants is available to the public by
request or by Internet access,4 but local law enforcement
can also provide information on registrants to the
community at-large "by any method of communication it
deems appropriate."47
instance, expressly excepts juvenile sex offenders from its compulsory registration
and notification scheme, mandating that "certain precautions should be taken to
target the juveniles that pose the more serious threats to the public." Ala. Code §
15-20-20. Juvenile offenders are thus subject to community notification only upon
request by the state and ultimate recommendation by the sentencing court, which
evaluates each juvenile offender in terms of recidivism-related criteria. Ala. Code
§ 15-20-28(c)-(g). If the court concludes that notification is warranted, the
juvenile is categorized in any of three risk-levels, with level three entailing the
same aggressive public notification as experienced by adult sex offenders. Ala.
Code § 15-20-28(g). See also, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-251(b)(c) (allowing
court to "exempt" certain low-level offenders but only if otherwise "not required
for public safety."); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4121(e)(6)(7) (permitting sentencing
court to grant classification relief under limited circumstances and permitting
prosecution to seek court approval of classification "higher than the presumptive
tier").
At the same time, statutory law can permit supervising courts limited
discretion to require registration, and hence perhaps notification, for non-
enumerated offenses. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-254(a) (any felony
"committed for a sexual purpose").
41. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-102 (1997).
42. See id § 40-39-106(f).
43. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 583 (1999).
44. See id.
45. See id § 584.
46. See id §§ 584(C),(D).
47. Id. § 584(H)(3).
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Similarly, in Alabama, certain juveniles and all adults
convicted of a "criminal sex offense," 8 as specified by
statute, are subject to compulsory registration and
community notification by means of a "notification flyer,"9
which is distributed by hand or regular mail by police." In
Alabama's larger cities, all persons who live within 1,000
feet of the registrant's declared address are to be notified,
as well as all schools and child care centers within three
miles; in smaller cities and towns, residents within 1500-
2000 feet of the registrant's home, as well as schools and
child care centers within three miles receive notification.51
The Alaska Court of Appeals, interpreting the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act, recently articulated the
rationale supporting this compulsory approach:
Under ASORA, the Department of Public Safety collects the
information provided by each registrant but performs no
adjudication or classification of individual offenders. The
Department creates the registry and enables public access
to the registry .. . The legislature decided that the fact of
an offender's conviction for a sex offense was sufficient
reason to include that offender in the registry because of the
potential for re-offense. It is not an irrational conclusion for
the legislature to create the sex offender registry in
response to the potential for recidivism that sex offenders
48. Ala. Code § 15-20-21.
49. Id. § 15-20-21(3). In particular, the flyer, which is to be distributed before
the registrant's release or upon any change in residence, is to include:
Name; actual living address; sex; date of birth; complete physical
description, including distinguishing features such as scars, birth marks, or
any identifying physical characteristics; and a current photograph. This
statement shall also include a statement of the criminal sex offense for
which he or she has been convicted, including the age and gender of the
victim, and the geographic area where the offense occurred ....
Id.
50. Ala. Code § 15-20-25(a)(b). Alabama law also permits notification by
means of posting or by "publicizing the notice in a local newspaper, or posting
electronically, including the Internet, or other means available." Id. § 15-20-
25(b).
51. Id. § 15-20-25(a).
2000] 605
606 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:593
have as a group.5 2
The approach employed by the remaining states (and
the District of Columbia) involves the exercise of varying
degrees of discretion relative to registration and
classification-notification decisions. Four basic approaches
are evident.
1. Discretionary Risk Assessments Made as to "SVP" Status
Alone, By Courts
Seven jurisdictions single out potential SVPs for
special attention, directing the judiciary to make such
determinations. Within this group, six jurisdictions
require that courts make classification decisions based on
recommendations of expert review boards. 3 Another state,
Florida, relies on judicial determinations, but eschews
expert input. 4
Most but not all states in this group have statutory
procedures that guide judicial SVP determinations. Idaho
has perhaps the most expansive procedural standards of
any state in this category. In Idaho, a four-member board
makes an ex parte determination that a statutorily eligible
offender is a SVP, pursuant to criteria developed by the
board. 5 Offenders are entitled to seek judicial review of
52. Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
53. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-11.7-103, 18-3-414.5 (1999); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-
1-12 (1999); Idaho Code §§ 18-8312 to 8321 (1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542.1
(West 1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.20 (1999); W. Va. Code §§ 61-8F-2a to 2b
(1999). As a result of recent legislative enactment, North Carolina targets
juveniles for special treatment. Juvenile offenders convicted of specified sex
offenses are subject to registration only if found by the court to be a "danger to the
community." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.26. However, the information pertaining
to juveniles required to register is not available to the public. See id. § 14-208,29.
54. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.21 (West 1998).
55. Idaho law specifies as follows:
(3) The board shall establish guidelines to determine whether an offender
scheduled for release is a violent sexual predator presenting a high risk of
reoffense. The guidelines shall be established with the assistance of sexual
offender treatment and law enforcement professionals who have, by
education, experience or training, expertise in the assessment and
treatment of sex offenders.
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this determination within 14 days of receiving such
notice,56 and enjoy a right to counsel at the judicial hearing,
appointed if necessary.57  The hearing is "conducted as a
summary, in camera review proceeding, in which the court
decides only whether to affirm or reverse the board's
designation as a violent sexual predator."58 The court has
"broad discretion" with respect to whether and to what
extent to allow live witnesses and cross-examination, 9 and
the rules of evidence are inapplicable.0
In West Virginia, after the local prosecutor petitions
for SVP designation, the sentencing court conducts a non-
jury summary proceeding on the designation question. The
offender has a right to be present, to have assistance of
counsel, and to introduce evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.61 The court makes a finding of fact based upon a
"preponderance of the evidence" relative to whether SVP
status is warranted,62  upon consideration of the
recommendation of an expert advisory board.63
Under these regimes, sex offenders deemed
(a) Factors used in establishment of the guidelines must be supported in
the sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to
the risk of reoffense and be objective criteria that can be gathered in a
consistent and reliable manner.
(b) The guidelines shall include, but are not limited to, the following
general categories for risk assessment: seriousness of the offense,
offense history, whether the offense was predatory, characteristics of
the offender, characteristics of the victim, the relationship of the
offender to the victim, the number of victims and the number of
violations of each victim.
(4) If the offender has indicated an intention to reoffend if released into the
community and the available record reveals credible evidence to support
this finding, then the offender shall be deemed a violent sexual predator
regardless of the application of the guidelines.
Idaho Code § 18-8314(3)(4) (1999).
56. See id. § 18-8319(3).
57. See id. § 18-8319(3)(c).
58. Id. § 18-8321(4).
59. See id. § 18-8321(5).
60. See id. § 18-8321(6). The proceeding "is civil, not criminal, and remedial,
not adversarial." Id. § 18-8321(1).
61. See W. Va. Code § 61-8F-2a (1999).
62. Id. § 61-8F-2a(g).
63. See id. § 61-8F-2a(f).
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undeserving of SVP status are nonetheless subject to
registration and possible community notification, yet are
subject to less stringent verification requirements, shorter
periods of registration and, if notification is warranted, less
intrusive forms. However, no risk evaluations are made
relative to the non-SVP group.64
2. Discretionary Risk Assessments Made of Select Serious
Offenders, By Courts
In two states, Maryland and Ohio, statutory law
singles out broader categories of particular offenders for
discretionary risk classification. Maryland requires that
persons convicted of certain statutorily specified offenses be
labeled "child sex offenders" or "sexually violent offenders,"
and be subject to registration and notification."5 The
judiciary, however, is free to decide whether to classify a
statutorily eligible person as an "offender," which entails
the least onerous registration requirements, or a SVP,
which requires lifetime registration and extensive
notification.6
Ohio subjects all statutorily eligible sex offenders to
registration and review for SVP status but, in the SVP
hearing, also engages in risk assessments of non-SVP
offenders.6 7  If deemed undeserving of SVP status, an
offender is categorized as a "habitual sex offender" or
"sexually oriented offender," with the former category
reserved for those having been previously convicted of a
"sexually oriented offense."68 With respect to SVP
64. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6A (1999) (expressly creating two
programs: the "Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program" and
the "Sexually Violent Predator Registration Program").
65. Md. Code Ann., Crimes and Punishments § 792(a)(2),(10) (1999).
66. Id. § 792(a)(6)(10), (12).
67. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.09(B)(1) (Anderson 1999) ("The judge
shall conduct the [SVP] hearing prior to sentencing and, if the sexually oriented
offense is a felony, may conduct it as a part of the sentencing hearing."). The SVP
eligibility hearing otherwise must be conducted before the offender's release from
confinement. See State v. Brewer, 712 N.E.2d 736, 739 (Ohio 1999).
68. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.01(D) (Anderson 1999) (specifying sex
offenses).
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determinations, Ohio offenders receive notice of the
hearing and enjoy the right: to counsel (by appointment if
necessary); to testify; to present evidence; and to offer and
cross-examine witnesses.69  The court evaluates a list of
specified statutory SVP criteria and determines, by "clear
and convincing evidence," whether the offender is a SVP. 0
Both the offender and the State can appeal the sentencing
court's SVP decision.7' SVPs must verify their registration
status every ninety days throughout their lifetimes and
are exposed to maximum community notification.3
Offenders not deemed SVPs in the discretion of the
sentencing court (i.e., "habitual sex offenders" and
"sexually oriented offenders") are subject to less onerous
registration and notification requirements. "Sexually
oriented" offenders are not subject to community
notification, but must verify their registration status on an
annual basis for ten years; "habitual" offenders must verify
their registration status annually for twenty years, and can
be subject to extensive notification requirements, in the
discretion of the court.
3. Discretionary Risk Assessments Made of All Offenders,
By Local Law Enforcement
Although virtually all jurisdictions permit local law
enforcement some measure of discretion in the decision
whether to release notification information, 5 seven states
69. See id. § 2950.09(B)(1).
70. Id. § 2950.09(B)(2),(3).
71. See id. § 2950.09(B)(3).
72. See id. §§ 2950.06(B)(1), 2950.07(B)(1).
73. See id. § 2950.11(A)(B).
74. See id. § 2950.11(F).
75. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290(m)(n) (West 1999); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2c:7 to
10 (West 1994 & 1999 Supp.); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32.15(12) (1999). In a new
twist, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that a probation officer
possessed discretion to subject an offender to community notification, despite the
fact that the offender pled to misdemeanors not otherwise the subject of statutory
notification requirements. See State v. Misiorski, 738 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1999).
The probation officer saw fit to provide registration information to, inter alia,
members of the offender's bowling league, a practice the Misiorski court deemed
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direct local law enforcement to make offender classification
decisions, which determine the extent and scope of
community notification that ultimately occurs.7  The
authorities often make their decisions on the basis of
specified offender risk-related criteria, typically
promulgated by an appointed board originated to prepare
such criteria and oversee registration and notification.
Arizona law, for instance, provides for the creation of a
"community notification guidelines committee," the
politically bi-partisan membership of which is prescribed in
detail,77 which provides guidelines for local police to use in
reaching individual classification decisions.75  The
guidelines provide for three "levels of notification based on
the risk that a particular sex offender poses to the
community."79
permissible on the basis of the officer's discretionary authority. Id. at 601-02.
Justice Berdon dissented, stating that the majority afforded "probation officers
despotic discretion to violate a citizen's privacy arbitrarily and without any
judicial review whatsoever." Id. at 603 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
76. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3825 (West 1999); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 846E-
1 to 846E-3 (1999); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34-A §§ 11121 to 11144 (West Supp.
1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-4005, 29-4013 (Michie 1999); N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-32-15 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550 (West 1999); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 301.45, 301.46 (West 1999).
77. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3826(A) (West 1999). Several other states
impose similar political bi-partisanship requirements. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:7-11 (West 1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179D.700 (Michie 1999); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-37.1-12(A) (1999). Also, notwithstanding that the boards seemingly
operate in an executive capacity, it is not uncommon for state law to require that
the respective branches of government be represented on the board. See, e.g.,
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179D.700 (Michie 1999).
78. See Ariz. Stat. Ann. § 13-3825(C) (West 1999) (providing that "[a]fter
reviewing the information received and any other information available... the
local law enforcement agency shall categorize each offender and place each
offender into a notification level."). Despite the guidelines, it appears that officers
in different localities reach varied determinations. See Kathleen Ingley, A
Fearful Eye; Keeping Watch on the Valley's Sex Offenders; Monitoring
Procedures Get Tougher, Ariz. Republic, May 2, 1999, at Al (describing how
police in Gilbert, Arizona designated a particular offender a Level 2 offender,
while Phoenix police ranked the offender as a Level 1).
79. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3826(E). Local police in Arizona also possess
discretion to undertake community notification with respect to offenders not
specified by law. See id. § 13-3825(G) (providing that nothing shall prevent police
"from giving a community notice of any circumstances or persons that pose a
danger to the community under circumstances that are not provided for under
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In Nebraska, Maine, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and
Hawaii although statutory law mandates that certain
offenders must register, law enforcement officials enjoy less
fettered discretionary authority over individual notification
decisions. In Nebraska, the State Patrol is to promulgate
rules and regulations for the release of notification
information, once again based on three degrees of offender
risk. 0 The State Patrol has the ultimate responsibility for
assigning notification levels to all persons required to
register under Nebraska law.8 ' In Maine, statutory law
specifies which offenders must register as a "sex offender"
or a SVP, 2 while the State Department of Corrections is
charged with developing and applying a "risk assessment
instrument" in the evaluation of registered sex offenders.
However, local law enforcement then notifies those in the
community it "determines appropriate to ensure public
safety."84 Similarly, in Hawaii, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin, local law enforcement enjoys total discretion in
individual notification decisions.85
Finally, in Washington State, local law enforcement
agencies review initial risk level classifications made by the
State Department of Corrections and other relevant
agencies, which assign each eligible offender to one of three
classification tiers.86 In the event local law enforcement
this section").
80. See Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-4013(2) (Michie 1999).
81. See id. § 29-4013(2)(e). In Nebraska, in addition to the risk-level
determination made by the State Patrol, the sentencing court "may also
determine if the person is a sexually violent offender." Id. § 29-4005(2)(a). "When
making its determination the court shall consider evidence from experts in the
field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders." Id. § 29-4005(2)(a).
82. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34-A § 11222(1) (West 1999).
83. Id. §§ 11141, 1142(1)(D).
84. Id. § 11143(2). Maine law further provides that "[ulpon request, the
department shall provide to law enforcement agencies technical assistance
concerning risk assessment for purposes of notification to the public of a sex
offender's conditional release or discharge." Id. § 11144.
85. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E-3; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-15; Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 301.46.
86. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550(2),(3),(4) (West 1999). As a result of
recent legislative change, one factor influencing the risk-level determination is
whether the offender "lacks a fixed address." Id. § 9A.44.130(6)(b).
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assigns a different risk classification than that of the
agency, it must notify the appropriate agency and submit
its rationale for the departure. Preliminary data indicate
that law enforcement departures from agency decisions in
Washington occur almost as a rule, with the vast majority
resulting in one-level increases on the basis of "law
enforcement discretion."5
Decisions made by law enforcement authorities in this
group are made informally and outside the presence of
offenders, and no right of appeal is afforded with respect to
risk classification decisions.
4. Discretionary Risk Assessments Made of All Offenders
By Non-Law Enforcement
Finally, several jurisdictions require that risk
evaluations be made of all registration-eligible sex
offenders, based on risk-level determinations rendered by
persons or entities other than police. Jurisdictions in this
group employ four different evaluative methods.
Agency-Based
The first approach vests primary discretionary
authority in an executive agency, such as a parole board,
the state department of corrections, or a specially convened
Washington's appellate courts have on occasion addressed the
complexities of maintaining registration of homeless persons in particular. In
State v. Pickett, the Washington Supreme Court held that a homeless registrant
lacked a "residence" and therefore could not provide his address to the county
sheriff, as required by law. 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1999). However, in State v. Pray,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a registrant who failed to re-register
upon moving to another city, and thereupon established a succession of three
"temporary" residences. 980 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). Unlike the homeless
individual in Pickett, Pray knew "where he would sleep each night," although the
address was subject to change. Id. Therefore, although his residence was
"temporary," not "permanent," he had a duty to inform the sheriff of his
whereabouts.
87. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550(8).
88. Document Entitled "Departure Notice," dated Sept. 27, 1999, generated by
Department of Corrections, Division of Offender Programs, State of Washington
(on file with author).
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board, to make risk assessments and categorize statutorily
eligible offenders. 9 Arkansas," Iowa,91 Massachusetts,92
Minnesota,93  Nevada,94 Oregon, 95 Rhode Island,96 Texas,97
89. Despite the dominant role played by agencies in this category, it is
important to recognize that offenders deemed to warrant possible SVP status can
be subject to non-agency based determinations. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-
12-918(a) (Michie 1999); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178K(2)(c) (1999); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 179D.510 (Michie 1997); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-6(B) (1999). In
Massachusetts, for instance, the sex offender registry board can designate an
offender as both a level 3 offender and a SVP. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, §
178K(2)(c). The designation is subject to automatic review by the sentencing
court, which informs the offender of the designation, his right to be heard, and his
right to counsel. Id. The registry board's decision is defended by counsel
employed by the board and the court determines whether a preponderance of the
evidence supports SVP status. Id. If the court disagrees with the SVP
recommendation, the offender remains subject to level 3 classification. Id. The
offender, like all offenders classified by the registry board, is then entitled to seek
judicial review of the level 3 designation. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178M. It
is worth noting that this discretionary right to appeal also exists in other
jurisdictions, a right if exercised, can effectively vest ultimate classification
discretion in a reviewing court. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. §§ 24-1105(B)-(E)
(1999); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37.1-13 - 11.37.1-15 (1999).
90. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-1303 (Michie 1999) (specifying that
department of corrections or the "Sex Offenders Assessment Committee" is to
render classification decision).
91. See Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.13A (West 1999) (specifying that any of three
agencies is to provide assessment, depending on institutional status of offender).
92. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, §§ 178K, 178L (1999) (specifying duties of "sex
offender registry board"). Massachusetts procedural law has been significantly
affected by ongoing judicial modifications. For instance, citing due process
concerns, the Commonwealth's highest court in August 1999 required that all
eligible offenders receive a classification hearing, even those convicted of low-level
sex offenses (who, under Massachusetts law, are subject to notification by means
of public access). See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 715 N.E.2d 37 (Mass. 1999). In
response, the Massachusetts legislature recently refined and expanded the
already extensive procedural framework associated with sex offender
classifications. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, §§ 178K to 178M.
93. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.052 (West 1999) (specifying that an "end-of-
confinement review committee," housed in each state correctional and treatment
facility, assesses each statutorily eligible sex offender).
94. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 179D.720, 179D.730, 179D.7301 (Michie 1999).
95. Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.586 (1999) (specifying that Board of Parole and Post-
Prison Supervision, Department of Corrections or a "community corrections
agency" is to determine if a statutorily eligible offender is a "predatory sex
offender").
In Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the State's failure to afford offenders notice and a
hearing prior to classifying them as "predatory sex offenders" violated procedural
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and the District of Columbia s have adopted such an
approach. In Nevada, for instance, all statutorily eligible
sex offenders are evaluated by the Division of Probation
and Parole on the basis of a three-level recidivism risk
scale,9 9 employing guidelines prepared by the attorney
due process. 964 P.2d 990 (Or. 1998). According to the Noble court, the
consequences of community notification jeopardized a protectible "liberty
interest," requiring due process protections:
When a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of
determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having a
certain undesirable characteristic ... and that agency must by law gather
and synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that
determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere
reputation. The interest cannot be captured in a single word or phrase. It
is an interest in knowing when the government is moving against you and
why it has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in avoiding
the secret machinations of a Star Chamber. Finally, and most importantly,
it is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment
opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal and, perhaps, even
physical harassment likely to follow from designation.
Id. at 995. In response to Noble, the State now requires that a "paper trial" occur.
Offenders receive notice that they might be labeled a "predatory sex offender,"
and can submit written materials, but are not entitled to appear or present live
witnesses. Telephone Interview with Pam Wood, Oregon Deputy Attorney
General (Sept. 10, 1999) (interview transcript on file with author).
96. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-12(C)(4) (1999) (specifying that the "the parole
board shall assess the risk of re-offense of each offender referred to them for
community notification," and assign a risk level, based on criteria specified by
statute and guidelines promulgated by "notification advisory council."). Upon
request of the district attorney, however, the court is to determine whether a
particular offender warrants SVP status, based on the recommendation of the
"sexually violent predator board of review." Id. § 11-37.1-6(B).
97. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 62.03(a) (West 1999) ("Before a person who will be
subject to registration ... is due to be released from a penal institution, the risk
assessment review committee.., shall determine the person's level of risk to the
community using the sex offender screening tool developed ... . "). In Texas, the
sentencing court conducts the risk assessment of probationers, using the identical
risk assessment instrument. See id. § 62.03(c).
98. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-1104(a) (1999) (stating that the "Sex Offender
Registration Advisory Council" is to "develop guidelines and procedures to assess
the risk of a repeat offense and the threat posed to the public by the sex offender's
release."). In the District, persons categorized as level 2 or 3 offenders or a SVP
(but not level 1) can request an appeal of the Council's recommendation, and the
offender "shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the Advisory Council's
recommendation and to present evidence, by proffer or otherwise." Id § 24-
1105(C).
99. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 179D.720, 179D.730, 179D.7301. Sex offenders
placed on probation are assessed by the Division "on or before the sentencing of
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general and the "advisory council for community
notification."10  Although the initial assessment is
conducted ex parte, upon receiving notice of being
designated a class II or III offender, an individual can
request reconsideration of the designation, whereupon the
offender is permitted to appear personally to present
evidence in favor of re-designation, and the State can offer
rebuttal evidence. 10 Local law enforcement then carry out
notification in a scope and method consistent with the tier
ultimately designated. 10 2
Prosecutor-Based
In New Jersey, although statutory law specifies which
convicted sex offenders must register, prosecutors evaluate
each eligible sex offender for notification purposes in terms
of "risk of re-offense,"103 by means of a three-tier risk
assessment scoring system that accords points to different
risk factors identified by mental health and law
enforcement professionals (the "Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale").0 4 The prosecutor then notifies the
the offender." See Guideline 5.00 Risk Assessment Procedures; Timing, Office of
the Nevada State Attorney General, <http-www.state.nv.us/ag>.
100. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 179D.710, 179D.720.
101. See id. § 179D-740(2); Guideline 6.10, supra note 99.
102. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179D.730; Guidelines 8.00, 8.10, supra note 99.
103. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-8d(1) (specifying that '[the county prosecutor
of the county where the person was convicted and the county prosecutor of the
county where the registered person will reside, together with any law
enforcement officials that either deems appropriate, shall assess the risk of re-
offense by the registered person.").
104. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-8(a) (stating that "[a]fter consultation with
members of the advisory council ...the Attorney General shall promulgate
guidelines and procedures for the notification required pursuant to the provisions
of this act. The guidelines shall identify factors relevant to risk of re-offense and
shall provide for three levels of notification depending upon the degree of risk of
re-offense."). See generally Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for
the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws, June 1998 (containing "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale") (available
online at <http:www.state.nj.uslps/dcj/meganl.pdf>). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals described the scoring system as follows:
The Scale itself is a matrix with thirteen factors grouped into four
general categories: (1) Seriousness of Offense; (2) Offense History; (3)
616 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:593
registrant of the tier designation and that notification will
ensue unless the designation is appealed to the local county
court."5  If appealed, the registrant is entitled to a
summary in camera judicial hearing, with counsel
provided,' in which the court makes a "case-by-case"
determination of the propriety of the prosecutor's
determination."°7
Judge-Based
The next approach has been adopted by Wyoming,
which allocates classification authority entirely to judges.
In Wyoming, upon application by the district attorney,0 8
the court is to provide notice to the offender and conduct an
in-camera hearing, ultimately designating the offender's
risk of re-offense as "low," "moderate," or "high" based on
statutory criteria. 109
Characteristics of Offender; and (4) Community Support. Guided by the
promulgated examples and commentary, the prosecutors determine
whether the registrant poses a low, moderate, or high risk to the
community under each of the factors and assign zero, one, or three points,
respectively, for each factor. Then the prosecutors multiple these raw
scores by a coefficient, reflective of the relative weight attributed to the
various general categories by the creators of the Scale ....
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1084 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom.
Verniero v. W.P., 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
105. See Id. at 1086 (citing Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 382 (1995)).
106. See id.
107. See In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1171-72 (N.J. 1996). Procedural
requirements relating to judicial review in New Jersey's classification regime, in
particular proof requirements, are discussed at further length infra.
108. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(c) (Michie 1999) (specifying that district
attorney "shall file an application for hearing... if the offender is an aggravated
sex offender or a recidivist"). Wyoming law also cedes discretion to local
prosecutors relative to less serious statutorily eligible offenders. See id. (stating
that "[flor other offenders registered under this act, the district attorney shall file
an application for hearing under this section if, based upon a risk of reoffense
factors specified in W.S. 7-19-303(d), it appears that public protection requires
that notification be provided... ").
109. Id. § 7-19-303(c)(d). In Delaware, although classification decisions are
mainly compulsory, see supra note 39, the courts possess discretion to render
classification decisions with a limited subgroup of offenders. See Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, § 4121(a)(4)(e)-(f), (d) (stating that, upon motion by the State, the court is
to conduct risk level classification hearings for those having pled "guilty to any
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Hybrid
The last approach is utilized in three jurisdictions,
Kentucky,1 ' Montana,"' and New York,"2 where courts
render final classification judgments on all statutorily
eligible sex offenders, with varying degrees of deference
paid to initial assessments made by experts, on the basis of
risk-related criteria and guidelines. These jurisdictions
place premium importance on due process concerns,
typically affording offenders a right to counsel and
requiring that offenders receive notice of and have the
opportunity to be heard at the judicial proceeding."' At
such hearings, standard rules of evidence typically do not
apply,"4 and the reviewing court enjoys broad discretion in
the amount and type of evidence allowed," 5 including
expert testimony proffered on behalf of offenders."6
New York's recently modified law contains perhaps the
nation's most onerous procedural requirements of any
jurisdiction in this category, due in significant part to a
1998 federal court order enjoining application of New
York's sex offender classification law." v In New York, the
board of examiners of sex offenders conducts an initial
evaluation of all offenders statutorily eligible to register,
offense included in the originally charged offense" and those offenders convicted
of specified sex offenses before the effective date of the notification law, yet have
violated probation or parole).
110. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.570 (Michie 1999)
111. See Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-509 (1999). As a result of recent
amendment, Montana law provides that the Department of Corrections is to carry
out risk-level determinations in the event a statutorily eligible offender did not
receive a risk designation at the time of sentencing. See id. § 46-23-509(5).
112. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-a et seq. (McKinney 1999).
113. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-570; N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-m. But see
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-509 (1999) (specifying only that the sentencing court is
to review, inter alia, "any statement by the offender").
114. See, e.g., People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30,
1997). But see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.570(4) (stating that "[tihe court shall
conduct a hearing in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
115. See, e.g., In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1996).
116. See e.g., In re G.B., 685 A.2d 1252 (N.J. 1996).
117. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
118. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1 (McKinney 1999).
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on the basis of guidelines prepared by the board."9 The
board evaluates each offender in terms of "low,"
"moderate," or "high" risk, a designation, which as
elsewhere determines the duration of registration and
extent of community notification that will occur.2 0 The
offender is permitted to "submit to the board any
information relevant to the review."' 2' The evaluation
rendered by the board serves as a "recommendation to the
sentencing court,"122  which makes the ultimate
classification decision. The court notifies the offender of his
right to be heard at the proceeding and his right to counsel,
appointed if necessary.2' At the hearing, the court must
decide whether the district attorney has established by
clear and convincing evidence that the board's initial
recommendation was correct.24  In making its
determination, the court is to:
review any victim's statement and any relevant materials
and evidence submitted by the sex offender and the district
attorney and the recommendation and any materials
submitted by the board, and may consider reliable hearsay
evidence submitted by either party, provided that it is
relevant to the determination. Facts previously proven at
trial or elicited at the time of entry of a plea of guilty shall
be deemed established by clear and convincing evidence and
shall not be relitigated. 121
119. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(5). See generally Sex Offenders Registration
Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, November 1997.
120. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(6). Like New Jersey, New York's assessment
instrument entails a variety of recidivism-related criteria, requiring numeric
designations relative to numerous factors. See Guidelines, supra note 119.
121. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-n(3).
122. Id. § 168-1(6).
123. Id. § 168-n(3).
124. Id.
125. Id. When before the court, it appears that offenders lack the legal right to
call, and examine, their victims. See People v. Tucker, 676 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842
(N.Y. 1998) (denying offender's effort "to call the victim as a witness to establish
facts which he feels would be favorable to him in the overall review of the risk
assessment."). According to the Tucker court, the "review procedure is to assess
the defendant in order to protect the public; it was not created to place additional
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the court renders an order
"setting forth its risk level determination and the findings
of fact and conclusions of law on which the determination is
based."126
IV. SELECT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF OFFENDER
CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
As should be evident, jurisdictions use a variety of
approaches to determine whether particular sex offenders
warrant registration and community notification, and, if
warranted, the extent of such requirements. In nineteen
jurisdictions, legislatures effectively make the classification
decision, requiring that offenders convicted of specified
offenses be subject to varying degrees of registration and
notification, regardless of the individual risk they possibly
pose.27 In the majority of jurisdictions, however, discretion
is exercised (even if only with respect to the SVP
determination), requiring that individualized decisions be
made relative to offender risk.
The balance of this Article focuses on the varied
decision-making protocols of this latter group, and in
particular those jurisdictions affording some measure of
procedural due process in classification decisions. 28 In
particular, two of the most important areas of procedural
disagreement are examined: (1) how the burden of
persuasion on classification decisions is allocated and the
quantum of proof required; and (2) the availability and
extent of offender rights of appeal to classification
decisions.
burdens on victims of these crimes." Id. at 843.
126. N.Y. Correct. Law 168-n(3).
127. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
128. As noted above, in seven jurisdictions in Which discretion is exercised,
local law enforcement render ex parte decisions on classification decisions. See
supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
20001 619
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:593
(A) Burden of Persuasion
Courts and legislatures have reached varying results
over which party-the offender or the state-bears the
burden of persuasion on classification decisions, and the
quantum of proof by which this burden must be satisfied.
1.) Allocation of the Burden
Plainly, given the significant consequences attending
classification designations, the question of which party
bears the burden of satisfying classification criteria has
critical importance. Because it is the state that seeks to
impose registration and notification requirements on the
offender, logic and tradition would suggest that the state
should be the party required to shoulder the burden of
establishing the appropriateness of any ultimate
discretionary decision."9 Typically, however, this is only
impliedly so, as the issue of allocation is usually not
specified. 13 0
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing New
Jersey's classification scheme in the face of legislative
silence on the allocation issue, invoked the classic three-
part procedural due process analysis set forth in Matthews
v. Eldridge.'3 Interpreting the Matthews factors, the court
in E.B. v. Verniero held that the persuasive burden rightly
belonged to the state, based on:
(1) the interest of the registrant and the state in an accurate
129. See Charles A. Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 5122 (1977 & Supp. 1999).
130. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-509; Ky. Stat. Ann. § 17.570.
131. The Matthews test weighs:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
safeguards; and finally, the Governments interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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determination of the relevant issues of fact..., (2) the
absence of a substantial economic or other burden to the
state from allocating the burden of persuasion to it, and (3)
our conclusion that such an allocation will materially reduce
the risk of error in those cases in which the allocation of
that burden plays a role.. 132
Similarly, New York law specifies that the district attorney
bears the burden of establishing "the duration of
registration and level of notification,"' 3' as recommended by
the board of examiners of sex offenders, when before the
reviewing court.
Not all jurisdictions, however, agree with this position.
In Minnesota, for instance, offenders bear the burden of
proving that the initial risk assessment made by the expert
board is erroneous.3 Pennsylvania law until recently also
imposed on offenders the burden of rebutting the statutory
presumption that SVP status is warranted. 13 5  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, citing to E.B.,
invalidated the approach on the rationale that it created
too great a risk of erroneous classification.36
2.) Quantum of Proof
Considerable variation also exists among jurisdictions
132. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom.
Verniero v. W.P., 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
133. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-n(3).
134. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.052(6)(a),(b).
135. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 9794 (1998).
136. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 608 (Pa. 1999), cert.
denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3311 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2000). Significantly, under the
Pennsylvania law before the court, the SVP determination also fixed the
offender's prison sentence (mandatory life), a factor of obvious importance to the
Williams court. Id. Compare Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996)
(invalidating statute that required defendants to prove by clear and convincing
evidence their incompetence to stand trial); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
452-53 (1992) (upholding statute that required defendants to establish their
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Gatewood,
184 F.3d 550, 554-55 (6th Cir. 1999) (invalidating federal "three strikes"
sentencing statute that required convicted felons to disprove the violent nature of
their prior felony convictions by clear and convincing evidence).
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on the related question of how much evidence must support
the classification decision. To a significant degree, the
quantum of proof question turns on how a jurisdiction
believes the risk of classification error should be
distributed, as between offender and the state, and the
extent to which such risk should be tolerated. As the
Supreme Court has stated, the proof standard selected
"reflects not only the weight of the private and public
interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how
the risk of error should be distributed between litigants.""7
Most often, the question is resolved by reference to the
nature of the proceeding itself."" For instance, in criminal
guilt adjudications, the most demanding standard of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" applies."9 In sentencing
proceedings, with guilt having been adjudicated, factors
can be established by a "preponderance of the evidence,"'
a civil law standard permitting confirmation of the
disputed fact by the greater weight (50%) of the evidence.14'
Finally, the "clear and convincing" standard, as
observed by one court, is required "where the interests at
stake are deemed to be more substantial than the mere loss
of money, there is a need to protect particularly important
individual interests, or [the outcome] might result in
stigmatization of the individualization." This
137. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). See also Cooper, 517
U.S. at 362 (stating that "[t]he more stringent the burden of proof a party must
bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision."); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citation omitted) (stating that the "function of a
standard of proof. . . is to 'instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the quantum of proof required
entails "a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of
erroneous factual determinations.").
138. See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (stating
that the nature of the procedural protections afforded should be appropriate to
the nature of the case).
139. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
140. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986).
141. See Fleming James, Jr. & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 7.6, at
316 (3d ed. 1985).
142. People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
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intermediate standard is met when the outcome is
supported by roughly 70% of the evidence. 43 In Addington
v. Texas, for instance, the Supreme Court held that in
involuntary civil commitment proceedings the state must
establish the appropriateness of commitment by "clear and
convincing evidence," given the loss of liberty and stigma
associated with involuntary commitment.144 According to
the Addington Court, an individual facing compelled civil
commitment should not "be asked to share equally with
society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
individual is significantly greater than any possible harm
to the state."45
The nature of sex offender classifications, however,
eludes ready classification. 46  Given that offenders
typically have already been adjudicated guilty of the crime
making them eligible for notification, the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard obviously need not apply. The
question remains, however, which of the lesser standards of
proof--"clear and convincing" or "preponderance of the
evidence"--best reflects the nature of the classification
proceeding?
Interpreting New Jersey law, the Third Circuit in E.B.
v. Verniero held that the state bears the burden of proving
to the reviewing court by clear and convincing evidence
that the tier classification-initially reached by
prosecutors-is proper.147  Stating that the "factual
determinations required in a Megan's law hearing are of
143. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
144. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
145. Id. at 427. The clear and convincing standard also applies in other
proceedings threatening similarly serious deprivations. See Cruzan v. Missouri
Dep't of Mental Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (termination of biological life-
support); Sanotsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (termination of parental
rights); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation of resident aliens);
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (denaturalization).
146. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (observing that
"[tihe question of what process is due convicted sex offenders at their risk level
classification hearings is a difficult one, given the unique nature of the proceeding
itself.").
147. 119 F.3d 1077, 1110-11 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Verniero v.
W.P., 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
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greater complexity than those typically involved in
sentencing, " 148 the E.B. court likened the classification
decision to that in Addington, insofar as both
determinations involve significant stigmatization and
largely depend on predictions of future behavior.14 The
majority weighed the respective risks as follows:
An erroneous underestimation of an individual's
dangerousness will not necessarily result in harm to
protected groups. Registration alone, which Megan's Law
mandates regardless of an offender's classification, allows
law enforcement officials to monitor offenders and provides
considerable disincentive to offenders to commit criminal
acts because of the high likelihood of being apprehended. On
the other hand, an overestimation of an individual's
dangerousness will lead to immediate and irreparable harm
to the offender: his conviction becomes public, he is officially
recorded as being a danger to the community, and the veil of
relative anonymity behind which he might have existed
disappears. 50
As for the countervailing governmental interest
involved, the E.B. court reasoned: "the state has no
substantial interest in notifying persons who will not come
into contact with the registrant; nor has it any interest in
notifying those who will come into contact with a registrant
who has erroneously been identified as a moderate or high
risk."'5' In short, the Third Circuit held, offenders should
not "'be asked to share equally with society the risk of
error." -" New York and Ohio also utilize a clear and
convincing proof standard.'53
Massachusetts, by contrast, uses a "preponderance of
the evidence" standard in judicial review of risk-level
determinations initially reached by its sex offender registry
148. Id. at 1111.
149. See id. at 1110.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1107.
152. Id. at 1110 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
153. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-n(3); State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 586 (Ohio
1998).
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board. 5 4 According to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, although there exists a risk that "the board will
apply general factors to the offenders that may not
correctly predict their propensity to reoffend," the risk is
minimized because of the adversarial nature of the
evidentiary hearing, the requirement that the board make
explicit findings, and the provision to offenders of the right
to appeal the decision to superior court. 15  The court
expressly rejected a clear and convincing standard, out of
concern for "erroneous underclassifications." 55 In so doing,
the court distanced itself from the Third Circuit's decision
in E.B., stating that the Third Circuit "concluded that the
possible injury to sex offenders from being erroneously
overclassified was significantly greater than any harm to
the State from an erroneous underclassification. We believe
that the harms of erroneous classification are more nearly
equal."5 7 Idaho, Minnesota and Rhode Island also use a
preponderance standard.5
8
Finally, the law of numerous states is silent on the
critical issue of proof quantum. Kentucky, for instance,
requires that eligible sex offenders undergo risk
154. Mass. Gen. Laws § 178L(2); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d
512, 520 (Mass. 1998).
155. Doe, 697 N.E.2d at 519.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 520 n.14. Justice Marshall disagreed, concluding that a clear and
convincing evidence standard "would enable police and community to focus on
those offenders who may pose an actual threat to young children and others that
the statute seeks to protect." Id. at 520-21 (Marshall, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). Justice Marshall also noted that the offense eligibility
criteria used by Massachusetts for registration are significantly broader than
those in New Jersey and New York, where designations are reached by the more
stringent clear and convincing evidence standard. See id. at 521. He stated:
Because the definition of 'sex offender' sweeps in persons whose crimes may
have nothing to do with victimizing anyone, much less the vulnerable
populations with which the statute is concerned, careful and individualized
due process is necessary to sort sexual predators likely to repeat their
crimes from large numbers of offenders who pose no danger to the public,
but who are nonetheless caught in the statute's far-flung net of
registration.
Id. (footnote omitted).
158. See Idaho Code § 18-8321(10),(11); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.052(6)(a),(b);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-16(B)(6).
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assessments by "certified providers" (at their own cost),
placing them in high, moderate, or low-risk categories,
which determine the duration of registration and extent of
community notification.159 The sentencing court reviews
the recommendation, as well as any victim statements and
materials submitted by the offender. After conducting a
hearing, at which the offender has a right to be heard and
have appointed counsel, "[t]he sentencing court shall issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter an order
designating the level of risk."6 ° Similarly, in the District of
Columbia, offenders are entitled to contest expert risk-level
determinations before the sentencing court, and to present
evidence, yet the law specifies only that "the court shall
consider the recommendations of the Advisory Council in
its determination of whether the offender is a sexually
violent predator and the level of risk of repeat offense."'"'
Other jurisdictions are similarly reticent on the issue."2
(B) Right of Appeal
Another area of procedural uncertainty concerns the
availability, and extent, of offenders' right to contest
classification designations. This is so despite the manifold
significant consequences of classification decisions-
including the duration and extent of community
stigmatization and the constant threat of vigilantism,
159. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.570. Other states similarly specify that offenders
are to pay for the evaluation themselves. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-8318.
160. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.570(6).
161. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-1105(4).
162. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crimes and Punishment, §§ 792 et seq.; Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 179D.710 et seq.; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 181.585 et seq.; Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 7-19-303. See also, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.21(5) (stating only that the
"sentencing court must make a written finding at the time of sentencing that the
offender is a sexual predator"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542.1 (stating only that
"[ulpon receiving a recommendation from the sexual predator commission, the
court shall make a determination as to whether or not an offender is a sexually
violent predator"); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-15 (stating only that "the court shall
determine upon motion of the state's attorney and after receiving a report from
the qualified board if that person is a sexually violent predator.").
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possibly for offenders' lifetimes.63 Less obvious, but no less
real, registrants must: verify registration information at
varying durations, often under threat of felony prosecution
if they do not;'6 endure significant limits on where they can
live and work;165 and in many jurisdictions forfeit, or suffer
163. See Doe v. Patald, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir. 1997) (detailing direct and
indirect negative effects of notification), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B.
v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1110 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied sub noa.
Verniero v. W.P., 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998). Furthermore, the classification
designation embodies a state action that does far more than merely reify a
released offender's status as a convicted sex offender. As Judge Myron Thompson
recently stated:
While it might seem that a convicted felon could have little left of his
good name, community notification.. . will inflict a greater stigma than
would result from conviction alone. Notification will clearly brand the
plaintiff as a "criminal sex offender" within the meaning of the Community
Notification Act- a "badge of infamy" that he will have to wear for at least
25 years-and strongly implies that he is a likely recidivist and a danger to
his community.
Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
164. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11-56.835 (class "C" felony); Ariz. Stat. Ann. § 13-
3824 (class "4" felony); Arkansas Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-12-904 (class "D" felony);
Del. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 § 4120(g) (class "G" felony); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 846E-
9(a) (class "C" felony); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.729 ("felony"); Mont. Code
Ann. § 46-23-507 (punishment "up to 5 years"); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 179D.290
(category ")" felony); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9A-44.130(9) (class "C" felony). Cf.
People v. Franklin, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 245 (1999) (addressing claim of registrant
who failed to maintain registry information and was therefore subject to "three
strikes" law). Such provisions are reminiscent of earlier registration laws of the
1930s, which had as one of their principle objectives the "incarceration or
expulsion of undesirables." See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police
Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 60, 63 (1954).
165. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20-26 (1975 & Supp. 1999); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
244.052(3)(k), (4) (1992 & Supp. 1999). In addition to legislative limits, local
authorities have imposed housing limits of their own. See, e.g., Town Restricts
Sex Offenders, Denver Rocky Mtn. News, Aug. 26, 1999, at 39A (noting decision of
the Lakewood Town Board, in a Denver suburb, barring more than one registered
sex offender from living in a residence). Even in the absence of such formal
limits, notification creates significant housing-related difficulties. See, e.g., David
Chanen, Threat Lead to Eviction of St. Paul Sex Offender; Cases Illustrates
Trouble Placing Level 3 Ex-cons, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), Feb. 26, 1998, at 1B
(recounting several scenarios including that involving one offender who was
forced to live in the car of his parole officer); Lisa Sink, Long After Release Date,
Man Still Lives in Prison, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 1, 1999, at 1
(discussing plight of registrant who tried in vain for one year to find housing and
was eventually returned to prison for failure to find housing).
In his recent book, Professor Amitai Etzioni, a promoter of
"Communitarian" values, proposed a solution to the dilemma faced by states and
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major limits on, their freedom to change their legal
names.16  Despite these significant consequences, the law in
the vast majority of states is silent on the question of
appeal. 16  In others, a right to appeal exists, but its
contours remain uncertain.6 8 In others still, the right exists
in limited form, perhaps permitting only review of SVP
1691 ee 170decisions or level II and III offenders, or seemingly
local communities. Etzioni advocates locating sex offenders:
[in a] guarded village or town where they are allowed to lead normal lives
aside from the requirement that they stay put. Those sentenced to stay in
such a place could have jobs, visitors, free access to TV, unlimited phone
privileges, and bank accounts; they could come and go within the
community as they wished, conduct a social life, have town meetings and
elections, or even have their spouse move in with them (although no
children would be allowed to live in these places). These places could be
quite expansive and might include, for instance, adjacent beaches, lakes, or
ski areas.. . The basic idea is that even though society needs to be
protected from high-risk sex offenders, those offenders who have completed
the punitive stage of their sentence should be allowed to lead nearly
normal, autonomous, and private lives, at least as much as possible under
the circumstances.
Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy 73-74 (1999).
166. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. § 1279.6 (no change unless "it is in the best interest
of justice to grant [the name change] and doing so will not adversely affect the
public safety."); 730 IIl. Comp. Stat. 5/21-101 (duration of registration); Indiana
Code § 5-2-12-8.6 (no change unless upon new marriage); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
547:3-i (permitted only if petitioner "makes a compelling showing that a name
change is necessary."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (no change during period of
registration); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.130(7) (no change if county sheriff
determines that doing so "will interfere with legitimate law enforcement
interests, except that no order shall be denied when the name change is requested
for religious or legitimate cultural reasons or in recognition of marriage or
dissolution of marriage.").
167. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 24-1105; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175D.740; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-208.20; W. Va. Code § 61-8F-2a; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-
307.
168. See e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-1303(f) (stating only that the department
of corrections and the "Sex Offender Assessment Committee" are to "promulgate
rules and regulations to establish the appeal process for the assessments and
determinations."); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.570(7) (specifying only that the
sentencing court's "order designating risk shall be subject to appeal.").
169. See, e.g., Downs v. State, 700 So. 2d 789, 789-90 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998)
(invoking state rules of appellate procedure to permit direct appeal of sexual
predator designations alone); Idaho Code § 18-8321(14) (expressly stating that
non-SVP designated registered sex offenders are not entitled to judicial review of
their registration and notification status); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.09(B)(3)
(expressly permitting only appeal of SVP status, but extending the right to
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extends only to review by the sentencing court of the
classification decision reached by the entity charged with
making the initial classification decision.7 1
New York, until very recently, barred the right to
appeal. However, as a result of recent legislative changes
prompted by federal judicial intervention,' 2 both the state
and the offender now "may appeal as of right" from the
court's classification order. 73 However, in a decision
rendered before the legislative modification, the New York
Court of Appeals provided what remains the best
discussion of the uncertain legal status of registrants' right
to appeal. In People v. Stevens,'74 the court held that,
absent an expressly enunciated right in statutory law, two
sex offenders lacked the right to appeal their
classifications. Citing to the avowed civil and regulatory
nature of the classification decision, the court rejected the
argument that classification represented a "final
disposition of the original criminal sentence," which would
carry a statutory right to appeal under New York law.
Whatever else the determination may be or be classified as,
we are satisfied that it and its registration and notification
requirements under the Act ... are not a traditional,
technical or integral part of a sentence that somehow
offender and state).
170. For instance, in the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New Jersey only
level II and III offenders enjoy such a right of review. In Massachusetts, on the
other hand, as a result of judicial intervention, offenders assigned to all risk
levels can seek review of the board's designation. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686
N.E.2d 1007, 1014 (Mass. 1997). See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, § 178M. In
Texas, the right to appeal expressly extends only to those subject to notification
by means of newspaper publication of their registration information, providing a
right to seek enjoinment of such publication. See Tex. Rev. Code Crim. P. § 62.07.
171. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 692A.13A(2); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37.1-12 to 11-
37.1-16; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(e).
172. See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456,477 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that
"[t]he lack of any provision for review of risk level determination effectively
denies convicted sex offenders the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate their
claims of due process violations at their risk classification hearings.").
173. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-n(3). The offender also enjoys a right to counsel
for such appeal, appointed if necessary. Id.
174. 692 N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 1998).
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relates back to or becomes incorporated into the antecedent
judgment of conviction.'75
In effect, the court reasoned, the "criminal action"
terminated upon sentencing; because the offenders had
served their sentence, the classification decision was both
temporally and legally distinct from the sentencing
decision, precluding a right to appeal. According to the
unanimous court, classifications are "neither an
amendment to the judgment of conviction, nor a
resentencing."7 7 Rather, they are "discrete" determinations
that "are a consequence of convictions for sex offenses."7 8
Because "'no provision of the New York Constitution
constrains the Legislature to provide a right of review by
an appellate court of every decision,""179 and the Legislature
noticeably failed to codify a right of appeal in the Sex
Offender Registration Act, the Court of Appeals was loath
to invoke an "alternative source of authority to fill the gap
that the offenders would like us to fill."180 The Stevens
court also expressly deferred on elucidating the "true
nature" of the classification decision: whether the court "is
acting qua court or as a distinct quasi regulatory entity."'8'
If the latter, the court implied but did not endorse, that
registrants might have a right to "some discrete,
175. Id. at 987.
176. Id. at 987-88.
177. Id. at 988.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting People v. Gersewitz, 61 N.E.2d 427, 429 (N.Y. 1945)). See also
id. at 989 (noting that "new-type proceedings and attendant direct criminal
appeals may lie within the criminal procedure orbit only if jurisdiction to review
such determinations is otherwise prescribed by statute."). Cf. McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (stating that "review by an appellate court of
the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the
accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary element
of due process of law.").
180. People v. Stevens, 692 N.E.2d at 988. The court added: "While some may
persuasively point to policy reasons why a risk level assessment ought to be
subject to some form of 'appellate' review, that is no substitute in these
circumstances for a legislative authorization by enactment of an appropriate
statutory regime." Id at 990.
181. Id.
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authorized appellate review" of an administrative nature.82
Administrative review is, in fact, available in a few
jurisdictions. Minnesota offenders can seek review of their
risk level designations before an administrative law judge,
and the review hearing is subject to the applicable
administrative review standards. 8 3  Minnesota law
expressly provides that the judge's decision is "final."184
Oregon also permits administrative review before Oregon
appellate courts of notification classification decisions, 88
subject to the significant deference typically afforded
182. Id. To complicate matters further still, the Court of Appeals in a
subsequent, but pre-legislative amendment decision, People v. Hernandez, 711
N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1999), held that those subject to the law enjoyed a right to
appeal the court's "certification that the person is a sex offender-as opposed to
the "risk level determination," as addressed in Stevens. See N.Y. Correc. Law §
168-d(1) (McKinney 1999) (stating that upon conviction 'the court shall certify
that the person is a sex offender and shall include the certification in the order of
commitment. The court shall also advise the sex offender of the duties of this
article."). According to the Hernandez court, the certification is appealable and
reviewable as part of the judgment of conviction, as distinct from the
classification decision addressed in Stevens, which occurred "postsentence."
Hernandez, 711 N.E.2d at 975-76. "Risk level determinations thus fell into an
appellate void, which the Court eschewed filling in the absence of any legislative
prescription and authorization." Id. at 976 (citing Stevens, 91 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276).
Certification, on the other hand, was not "belated" but rather "actually and
temporally and part of the judgment of conviction," and hence appealable as of
right. Id. at 977. The court concluded by offering that the "arguable lack of
symmetry merely reemphasizes the need for plenary legislative consideration of
the appellate review possibilities of all these intricate procedural tracks and
timetables." Id.
183. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.052(6)(a),(b), (d) (West 1999).
184. Id. § 244.052(6)(c). Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed
the claim of an offender who had been convicted of a burglary and charged, but
not convicted, of a sex offense, yet was designated a level III sex offender by the
committee, triggering maximum community notification. See In re the Risk Level
Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). The C.M. court
characterized the outcome as "unprecedented in that at no point does the state
bear the burden of proving, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
offender actually committed a sex offense," and held the notification provision
applicable to only persons actually convicted of offenses for which registration is
required. Id. at 398-99. Compare Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn.
1999) (concluding that an offender but not convicted of an enumerated felony can
be subject to registration alone).
185. See Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990
(Or. 1998); Schuch v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 912 P.2d 403
(Or. Ct. App. 1996).
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agency decisions. 8 '
Finally, New Jersey, the jurisdiction in which the
modern sex offender registration and notification
movement largely began, affords an express right to direct
judicial appeal. As noted earlier, in New Jersey, the local
prosecutor evaluates the offender's risk of reoffense
pursuant to the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale, and
makes a risk-level designation on that basis, which the
prosecutor must support by clear and convincing evidence
if appealed to a court.'1 7 The court's classification decision,
however, "is subject to judicial review by either side
through appeal."5 5 With direct judicial review available,
New Jersey appellate courts on numerous occasions have
seen fit to reduce risk classifications reached by lower
courts. 189
In short, widespread disagreement currently exists
over the availability and extent of offender rights to appeal
classifications. Although jurisdictions often permit non-
SVPs to petition at a later date for relief from registration
186. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 183-482(8) (setting forth grounds for remand).
187. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
188. In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1172 (N.J. 1996).
189. See, e.g., In re R.F., 722 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(reducing assigned risk level from II to I ); In re E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (doing same and concluding that "the registrant has
not been shown to be the type of sexual offender contemplated by the community
notification provisions of Megan's Law ... [Ihf Megan's Law is applied literally
and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial purpose of this
law will be impeded.").
In New York, as well, the courts have modified initial classification
recommendations made by the board of examiners of sex offenders. See, e.g.,
People v. Jimenez, 679 N.Y.S.2d 510, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (reducing
registrant classification from level 2 to level 1, based on de novo review of the
record). It remains to be seen how the recent provision by the New York
Legislature of a right to direct judicial appeal beyond the lower courts will
influence the perceived accuracy of classification determinations. See supra notes
117-26 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislative modifications).
In Ohio, where there exists a right to appeal SVP designation, the case
law reflects numerous successful appeals. See, e.g., State v. Shepherd, No. CR-
176217, 1999 WL 632901 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Aug. 19, 1999); State v.
Wimberly, No. CR-237301, 1999 WL 608802 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist., Aug. 12,
1999); State v. Thomas, No. 98CA16, 1999 WL 624540 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist.,
Aug. 10, 1999).
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and notification, usually after ten or fifteen years of crime-
free community release,10 the vast majority of states fail to
offer specific guidance on the question of appeals. As made
clear in the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Stevens, 9' legislative silence can have dispositive effect in
the absence of some avenue of administrative redress.
192
This is especially so because risk classification decisions do
not appear subject to the writs of mandamus 19' or habeas
corpus. 94  Conceivably, declaratory relief might be
available, 95 but such relief is speculative due to the fact
that classifications are "civil," precluding any Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 96
190. Typically, the duration depends on the risk level designation. See, e.g.,
D.C. Code Ann. § 24-1105(5); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179D.760. In Montana, level II
and III offenders can petition to change risk designations, but only after having
successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. See Mont. Code Ann. §
46-23-509 (4) (1997). The court is authorized to modify the designation if it finds
"by clear and convincing evidence that the offender's risk of committing a repeat
sexual offense has changed since the time sentence was imposed." Id. Compare
W. Va. Code § 61-8F-4(2) (1997) (requiring registration "for life").
As a result of legislative changes in 1999, Louisiana offenders can no
longer petition the sentencing court to be relieved of the duty to register (and
hence be subject to notification). See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 584 (West 1999).
Applying the former law, one Louisiana appellate court recently upheld a lower
court's grant of relief to a man convicted of bigamy, otherwise subject to
compulsory registration and notification. See State v. Griffin, No. 99-K-2025,
1999 WL 1079621 (La. App. 4th Cir., Nov. 17, 1999).
191. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (discussing same).
192. In many respects, sex offender classifications rendered by agencies or
specially created boards resemble parole decisions customarily undertaken by the
executive branch, decisions also governed by statutorily-based procedures and
criteria. It is well-settled that decisions to grant or deny (but not to revoke)
parole are matters of executive grace, virtually immune to substantive judicial
review. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1 (1979). See generally Arthur W. Campbell, The Law of Sentencing
§ 17.7-17.8 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1998). At the same time, however, it is apparent
that the consequences of classification decisions, which can extend far beyond the
parole period of offenders, differ from run-of-the mill parole decisions, and that
therefore less judicial deference is arguably warranted.
193. See, e.g., Pisarri v. State, 724 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
194. See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that no right to federal habeas exists because offender is not "in custody"), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 824 (1999).
195. See, e.g., Angell v. State, 712 So. 2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(adverting to possible relief by way of state declaratory relief).
196. See, e.g., Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
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V. CONCLUSION
Current sex offender classification approaches, for
better or worse, bear obvious earmarks of actuarial
justice.9 7 This influence is most apparent in jurisdictions
that eschew individual risk assessments in favor of
legislative imposition of compulsory registration and
notification for those offenders convicted of specified sex
offenses.19 But it is also manifest in those jurisdictions
actually engaging in individualized decision-making as to
offenders, especially when based on risk assessment
scales'99 prepared by "expert boards.200
(rejecting Sixth Amendment claim because "the sexual predator proceedings were
not criminal or quasi-criminal in nature").
197. It remains an open question whether this influence, to the extent it is
based on ambiguous social scientific estimates of recidivism, represents a
perversion of the salutary goals of scientific input in legal decision-making.
Several commentators have assailed the use of recidivism data in the context of
SVP commitments. See John Q. LaFond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be
Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and
Policy, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 375 (1999); Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success Like
Failure/and Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v.
Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1247 (1998); Howard Zonana, The Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders, Science, Nov. 14, 1997, at 1248.
198. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
199. See People v. Salaam, 666 N.Y.S. 2d 881, 887 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (noting
that "the calculated presumptive risk level is based upon factors or overrides
which experts and professionals in the field have indicated are the greatest
predictors of future behavior."). The scales commonly enjoy presumptive validity.
See, e.g., In re G.B., 685 A.2d 1252, 1264 (N.J. 1996) (stating that "[cihallenges to
the Scale itself, or challenges to the weight afforded to any of the individual
factors that comprise the Scale, are not permitted. Instead, all challenges must
relate to the characteristics of the individual registrant and the shortcomings of
the Scale in his particular case."). But see In Re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1171 (N.J.
1996) (stating that "the scale is not a scientific device. It is merely a useful tool to
help prosecutors and courts determine whether a registrants risk of re-offense is
low, high, or moderate.").
200. The boards themselves pose an interesting set of legal questions. In
addition to bearing responsibility for promulgating applicable evaluation rules
and criteria, they wield enormous power over offenders, for periods of time that
extend well beyond that exercised by traditional probation and parole authorities.
In Massachusetts, for instance, where the board has foremost decision-making
power, if an offender seeks judicial review of the board's decision, the board is to
"defend" its classification, with an attorney employed by the board. See Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6, § 178M. Massachusetts' highest court recently dismissed
concern over this apparent conflict, arising "because the same agency would both
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Conceived in broad systemic terms, the procedures
adopted by legislatures and courts reflect value choices
based on risk and its allocation. Those jurisdictions using
the compulsory method of classification show utmost risk
averseness, motivated by a deference to aggregate
estimates of sex offender risk. In those jurisdictions
permitting the exercise of discretion in the classification of
offenders, less actuarial deference is shown. There, risks of
error,20 1 i.e., subjecting those offenders who will not
recidivate to the travails of notification, are weighed
against the averred community safety benefits of
registration and notification.0 2 As discussed, however,
even within this latter group, jurisdictions manifest varied
tolerance for risk. Rights of appeal, and burdens of proof
and their allocation, can at once be outcome-determinative,
and reflect a given jurisdiction's values relative to risk (of
recidivism and hence error).203
prosecute and adjudicate the risk classification claim," expressing its hope that
the board would "develop internal procedures which provide offenders with fair
and impartial hearings." Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 686 N.E.2d 512, 517
n.11 (Mass. 1998). See also Doe v. Attorney Gen., 715 N.E.2d 37, 45 nn.19, 20
(Mass. 1999) (emphasizing the significant rule making authority delegated to
board by the Massachusetts Legislature). Compare N.Y. Correct. Law sec. 168-
n(3) (providing that "[tihe state shall appear by the district attorney, or by his or
her designee, who shall bear the burden of proving the facts supporting the
duration of registration and level of notification sought [by the examiners' board]
by clear and convincing evidence.").
201. What Ronald Dworkin would call "the moral harm" of erroneous
adjudications. See Renald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 79-84 (1985). See also
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. 97-2462, 1997 WL 819765 at *6 n.13
(Mass. Sup. Ct., Dec. 22, 1997) (stating that "[tihe conflicting research and
studies ... highlight the potential for error in making a determination as to risk
of reoffense without any sort of hearing.").
202 See e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.02(A)(1) (legislative finding that "[i]f
the public is provided adequate notice and information... members of the public
and communities can develop constructive plans to prepare themselves and their
children.... ").
203. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 at 1809 (1979) (noting that
"standards of proof are important for their symbolic as well as for their practical
effect."); Robert Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 Geo. L.J. 887, 889 (1999)
(observing that "procedure has substantive effects and involves controversial
value choices."). See also Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern
Discourse 22 (1992) ("By allocating in advance certain procedural and evidentiary
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At present, sex offender classification laws and
procedures are in the midst of a period of significant
change, serving as true testament to Justice Cardozo's
precept that "[s]tatutes are designed to meet the fugitive
exigencies of the hour.20 4 From a resource perspective,
although the most expansive actuarial model
(characterized by legislative presumptions as to risk and
compulsory classification) carries short-term benefits
because of its avoidance of individualized, procedure-bound
classification decisions," 5  it is increasingly becoming
apparent that registration and notification themselves are
very costly and burdensome. Such systemic costs range
from increased demands on scarce judicial resources,
because sex offense suspects are less likely to plead guilty
and thus automatically become subject to registration and
notification,"' to the enormous demands on local law
enforcement faced with implementation of the blunderbuss
burdens ... legislation favors substantive outcomes that defy the bland and
balanced rhetoric one finds in many statutes. .... "). Cf. Edson R. Sutherland, An
Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedure in Legal Education, 21 Mich. L.
Rev. 372, 381-82 (1922) (referring to substantive law as "primary and
constitut[ing] an essential part of the structure of society," in contrast to
procedural law which is "secondary and derivative, and merely serves to make
[the former] operative.").
204. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 83 (1921). Cf.
Carol Steiker, Death, Taxes, and - Punishment? A Response to Braithwaite and
Tonry 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1793, 1798 (1999) (recognizing that "[tihe division of labor
in the American constitutional system creates incentives for legislators to create
very broad criminal laws and very high sentences.").
205 See generally D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of
Administrative Procedures 122-27 (1996) (discussing costs and social benefits
associated with added procedural protections).
206. See Alison Bass, Suspects Battle to Stay Off Sex Offender Registry, Boston
Globe, Aug. 16, 1999, at Al (stating that "[pirosecutors, defense attorneys, and
probation officials say defendants' fears of being publicly branded a sexual
criminal" account for a 22% increase in sex offense jury trials from 1996-1998).
It goes without saying, as well, that discretionary approaches surveyed here, to
varying degrees, carry resource demands. In Massachusetts, for instance, the
estimated annual operating budget of the sex offender registry board, which
classifies eligible offenders, will run to $10 million as a result of the recent
legislative expansion of due process rights accorded potential registrants. See
Brian MacQuarrie, Overhaul Set on Sex Offender Registry; Cellucci to Sign Bill
That Revives Board, Boston Globe, Sept. 10, 1999, at Al.
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classification regimes.0 7 Eventually, even putting aside
the persistent concerns over the efficacy of registration and
notification,2 8 the resource strain alone associated with the
inevitable overestimates that occur with such a
compulsory, actuarial model, might compel states to move
toward a narrower, more individualized approach.209  Only
time will tell.
207. See, e.g., Kay Lazar, States Lack Money, Manpower to Do the Job, Boston
Herald, July 19, 1998, at 9; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Notification Process on Sex
Offenders Runs into Difficulties, Providence Journal, Mar. 28, 1999, at 2;
Editorial, Compliance Money Sought, Seattle Times, Jan. 11, 1999, at B3. See
also People v. Kearns, 677 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating that
"it would unreasonably burden criminal justice officials to require them to
maintain maximum scrutiny of all convicted sex offenders, when statistics
indicate that only about 5 % of them actually qualify as 'high risk' public
menaces.").
In Arizona, six full-time state employees dedicate their working hours to
verifying the addresses of registered offenders; the City of Phoenix employs six
detectives whose sole job is to monitor offenders and perform notifications, yet the
City predicts that its program will "have to grow dramatically." See Kathleen
Ingley, A Fearful Eye: Keeping Watch on the Valley's Sex Offenders; Monitoring
Procedures Get Tougher, Ariz. Republic, May 2, 1999, at Al. To defray the costs
of registration and notification, many jurisdictions now require that offenders pay
a fee or "surcharge." See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-911, 12-12-918; Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 24-33.5-415.5; Iowa Code § 692A.11; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. § 34A-11226;
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-504(5) (1999).
208. See, e.g., James R. Acker & Catherine Cerulli, When Answers Precede
Questions: Megan's Laws' Uncertain Policy Consequences, 34 Crim. L. Bull. 23,
246-49 (1998) (examining pitfalls, including the tendency of the laws to engender
a false sense of security within communities, in part because offenders will "go
underground" to avoid notification; the increased chance that offenders will
commit crimes, due to the isolation, pressures and ostracism they experience; and
the likelihood that offenders' rehabilitation will be hindered); Lenore M.J. Simon,
Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 Ariz. L.
Rev. 485 (1999) (criticizing the laws for their failure to give effect to the empirical
reality that most sex crimes committed against women and children do not
involve "strangers").
209 Cf. State v. Stevens, No. 81, 633, 1999 WL 1062932 *6 (Kan. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that "[a] strong argument can be made for requiring a court to
determine a level of risk involved on a case-by-case basis .... We can assume
here that the legislature carefully studied such a proposal and rejected it.").

